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PRINCIPLES: SOFT OR HARD
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Should we conceive of principles as hard or soft? This is a question 
that  has  been  mentioned  many  times  in  previous  chapters,  but  not 
clearly  stated  and  analyzed  so  far.  On  the  one  hand,  we  regard 
principles as hard norms that should be strictly implemented, which is 
a line of thinking expressed in ordinary language. What we mean by 
saying  ‘a  man  of  principle’  is  that  he  strictly  follows  his  moral 
obligations and seldom betrays them. Principles are the bedrock of that 
man, hard to shake and change.  In this sense,  principles are by no 
means ‘soft,’ but ‘hard’ to be followed in each case. Principles demand 
consistency in strict application and do not allow for a trade off.  
On the other hand, principles can be balanced with other principles 
and thus are also taken as ‘soft’ in accommodating future changes. For 
example, a daughter, when encouraged and persuaded by her relatives, 
may hide the truth from her father about his tumour in order to relieve 
him from possibly unbearable psychological pain. Here the principle to 
be honest has to be balanced with her father’s well being. In this sense, 
the  soft  side  comes  from  the  obligation  to  balance  competing 
principles  in  practical  reasoning,  and  leads  to  some  temporary 
compromise or trade off.  
We  can  observe  the  two  opposing  features  in  legal  theory, 
particularly in a pair of articles, From Principles to Pragmatism and 
From Principles to Principles, which have been discussed in my last 
chapter. While Atiyah held a concept based on the hard feature, or a 
rule model, Stone criticized his view and argued that principles can 
allow for compromise and balancing and thus are soft.
2  Dworkin’s 
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thesis of legal principles also displayed both features. He revealed the 
hard  side  when  he  strongly  argued  for legal  principles  as  trumping 
rights allowing no trade off. But he also used the concept in a soft 
sense. First, that principles are not applied in a case does not prevent 
them  from  being  applied  in  future  cases.
3  Secondly,  in  his  later 
writings, he indicated that appropriate balance between principles is 
needed to have a good part of constitutional law.
4 
Even  more  confusing  is  that  we  can  observe  both  features 
simultaneously in morality and law. Moral principles such as ‘to be 
honest,’ ‘you shall not kill’ and ‘keep your promise’ bear both a ‘hard’ 
and a ‘soft’ feature at the same time. Principles like ‘you shall not kill’ 
are  not  always  applied  in  war  and  in  self-defence.  Yet,  it  is  not 
possible to deny them the status of principle for that reason.
5 The same 
applies to legal principles, particularly those of constitutional law, as 
can be demonstrated in the development of American constitutional 
adjudication.  For  instance,  even though  balancing  which entails  the 
soft side of principle is prevailing in current legal theory and legal 
practice  many  constitutional  cases  are  still  decided  simply  in  non-
balancing ways. In other words, balancing and non-balancing, the hard 
and  soft  side  of  principles,  co-exist  in  many  fields  in  American 
constitutional  law.
6  The  co-existence  of  the  two  opposing  features 
                                                                                                                   
1981. P. S. Atiyah, "From Principles to Pragmatism: changes in the function of the 
judicial process and the law," Iowa Law Review, Vol. 65, 1980.  Henley observed 
that mid-level principles, like no one shall benefit from his wrong, have a kind of 
rule-like character in application. Kenneth Henley, "Abstract Principles, Mid-level 
Principles, and the Rule of Law," Law and Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1993, pp. 
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explains why some constitutional theorist regards constitution as rule 
based, while others view it as principle based.
7 
This  co-existence  leads  to  the  following  two  closely  related 
puzzles.  The  first  is  how  to  understand  principle’s  demand  for 
consistency. As I argued before, principles are normally assumed to 
maintain  consistency  and  continuity  of  an  agent  or  an  institution,
8 
which  provides  identity  and  predictability.  Once  balancing  is 
introduced, such a concept of consistency would be in danger. But in 
moral and legal spheres, it seems that balancing has not caused the 
assumed trouble. We will not say that the above-mentioned woman 
lying to her father is not honest. And we still think that a constitution 
is  consistent,  even  if  decisions  are  to  be  made  based  on  balancing 
different principles.  
Secondly,  whether  principles  are  soft  or  hard  also  concerns  our 
understanding of the nature of rules, especially their relationship with 
principles. If principles are taken as both soft and hard, then how can 
we understand rules, since we used to regard rules as having the all-or-
nothing character or hard feature? How can we distinguish rules from 
principles from a formal perspective? And if principles are both soft 
and hard, can we say that principles  may  consequently  merge with 
rules, or there are no such things as principles, as Schauer argued?
9 Or 
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philosophy and style Goldman, Goldman, Alan H., "Rules in the Law," Law and 
Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 6, 1997, p. 589. 
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governs itself and makes its own decisions by considering the peculiar circumstances 
it finds itself in. Such an institution is comprised of certain constitutive principles.  
9 Schauer’s view is that ruleness of rules displays a continuum with both a hard and a 
soft pole. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: a philosophical examination of 
rule-based decision-making in law and in life, Oxford England: Clarendon Press, 
1991. He thought that “there is no sidle norm-type properly designated as a principle, 
although the word does serve to mark one side of a number of useful distinctions.” 
Frederick Schauer, "Prescriptions in Three Dimensions," Iowa Law Review, Vol. 82, 
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rules and principles both have the dual-features but they distinguish 
from each other in other ways like importance and fundamentality? 
We need a satisfactory explanation to account for the two opposing 
features. To my knowledge, there are scholars talking about the two 
features only separately, but none has purposely related the opposing 
two  together  and  provided  a  full  explanation.  In  this  regard,  this 
chapter aims to investigate their co-existence and explain how they 
relate to each other from a philosophical perspective.  
INCOMMENSURABILITY 
First, I will analyze the hard side of principles. In this respect, Raz 
provides us with two good examples for illustration.
10 First, one will 
not trade his spouse’s company for money, even if it is a large sum. It 
is indeed a matter of principle. If he will do so, it means that he does 
not understand what love is at all. To have true love, one can never 
trade the sanctity of love with money in any form; since love, as a kind 
of human relationship and value, is incommensurable, if one cherishes 
it as the value he really wants in life. The second example is that some 
parents  hold  that  there  is  no  way  to  compare  having  and  breeding 
children with money, material position, status and prestige. If parents 
do  cherish  the  mutual  love between  parents  and  children,  they  just 
cannot sell their children, which is just against our moral principle. 
The failure of commensurability in this sense denotes a success in the 
pursuit of true love and parenthood.
11   
As these two examples reveal, a choice made on principle allows 
no trade off or compromise with other alternatives, which entails a 
decision of an all-or-nothing nature, but not a gradual one. The goals 
are based on different, incommensurable values. In this sense, we can 
say  that  the  hard  side  of  principle  derives  its  force  from  the 
incommensurability  of  values  prescribed  by  principles.  Raz’s  thesis 
casts  light  on  a  discussion  of  incommensurability.  Using 
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commensurability  and  comparability  interchangeably,
12  Raz  defined 
the concept in the following way: two values are incommensurable, if 
it  is  true  that  one  is  neither  better  than  nor  equal  to  the  other.
13
 
Incommensurability rejects the possibility to arrive at any judgment by 
comparing two values in decision making. According to Raz, there are 
two  kinds  of incommensurability,  namely,  marginal  or insignificant 
incommensurability, and significant commensurability. The first type 
points to the situation in which choices are not vital to an agent, like 
one whether to have a cup of tea or to go shopping in the afternoon.  
By contrast, the second type finds explanation in the far-reaching 
consequences of different options that may affect an agent’s lifelong 
project  and  change  his  relation  with  surroundings.  When  a  choice 
between two incommensurable options has far-reaching consequences, 
it is a  significant  one,  even  if  at  that moment our  reason  does not 
provide us with reasonable guidance.
14 Incommensurability marks the 
inability of reason in guiding our decision, since reason cannot offer 
any  help  in  comparing  two  values.    This  significant 
incommensurability we can observe in the above two examples, which 
do  not  allow  for  reason,  but  seem  to  imply  only  an  all-or-nothing 
choice.  
Raz  indicated  that  such  significant  incommensurability  derives 
from the constitutive role of values and relative goals of an agent that 
is based on preference rather than rational choices. An agent’s choice 
to pursue relative values, and then to achieve certain goals that serve 
                                                 
12  One  should  distinguish  incommensurability  of  values  and  incomparability  of 
options. They are two different things and the former does not lead to the latter. The 
truth  is  that  one  can  make  rational  choices  as  constellation  of  different  values, 
although they are incommensurable. Here we shall also note that incommensurability 
does not necessarily mean incompatibility although Raz has the opposite view. See: 
Burg,  Edwige,  The  Model  of  Principles:  the  quest  for  rationality  in  the 
implementation of conflicting principles,   University van Amsterdam, 2000, p. 117.  
13 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 322. Raz deployed his argument in an anti-
consequentism  setting  in  chapter  13,  because  he  thought  that  general 
commensurability is a common assumption of most consequentialists. (p. 357) In 
general, this concept is a strong argument to support the pluralism of values.  
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as reasons in practical reasoning, determines the meaning and well-
being  of  its  existence.  These  goals  and  values,  and  their  pattern  of 
constellation, constitute and display the existence and the richness of 
an agent’s life in such a way that their disappearance entails the non-
existence of the agent.
15 In this way, these constitutive values have to 
be  kept  and  secured  in  order  for  an  agent  to  be  himself,  and  to 
distinguish himself from others. That such values and goals constitute 
a certain identity of an institution consolidates the incommensurability 
of those constitutive values and goals per se.  
This  phenomenon  has  been  termed  by  Raz  as  constitutive 
incommensurability.  The  term  expresses  the  constitutive  role  of  a 
strong  belief  in  the  non-comparability  of  certain  options  in  social 
relations like exemplified in the above two cases. First, those who do 
not believe in the incommensurability of such social relationship, in 
Raz’s words, are not capable of having the relation. Real friendship 
and true love only can be enjoyed by those who believe that affection 
and sympathy involved are incommensurable with money and other 
values. Although Raz only applies this term to social relations, I think 
it also can be applied to goals and values prescribed by constitutive 
principles as well. To realize a principle, one must believe that the 
values and goals one is pursuing are incommensurable. Secondly, such 
a belief and attitude serves as a strong barrier against exchange and 
trade-off  and  thus  plays  an  important  role  in  their  pursuit.  It 
strengthens our loyalty in commitment, which contributes to what we 
observed as the hard side of principles. In these cases, as Raz noticed, 
incommensurable values are not just part of the inevitabilities of life, 
but building blocks of valuable pursuits and relationships.
16 
But one might raise a counter-case that a man may leave his spouse 
for a month to do a job in order to earn some money. He may argue 
                                                 
15  Here  we  can  recall  Fuller’s  first  principle  of  human  associations  that  entails 
substantive  ends  or  goals  for  an  agent  to  achieve.  He  pointed  out  that  when 
controversies  come  in  later  development,  parties  involved  have  to  resort  to  the 
original goals and ends, although they have been out of view for a while.  Fuller, 
Long  L.,  "Two  Principles  of  Human  Association,"  in:  Principles  of  Social 
Order,(Kenneth I. Winston ed.), 2nd.,Oxford (etc.): Hart Publishing Limited, 2002.  
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that it seems that he exchanges his wife’s company for money. But the 
two examples are in no way similar: the new case still keeps love in 
hand, while the first will loose it forever by missing the point of love. 
Thus  constitutive  incommensurability  entails  a  marking  point  of  a 
value, or a pointer, warning us that right from this point, there should 
be no less of it; or, right from this point, it is a matter of all-or-nothing 
business. Trading off one’s spouse  for  money, as a specific action, 
denotes such a warning point.  
This  is  what  Raz  called  a  symbolic  action  or  an  action  with 
symbolic significance.
17 It indicates the nature of a choice that has far-
reaching influences beyond the action itself. Raz thought that in this 
case its symbolic significance transcends the action’s real impact in the 
world, because the accepted social conventions determine its meaning, 
even  if  the  two  actions—viewed  in  themselves—are  apparently 
similar. He thought that the two actions owe their different meanings 
mainly to social convention.  
In this respect, I depart from Raz’s thesis and stress an argument he 
just passed over. The argument is that a symbolic action stands right at 
a  point,  a  marking  point,  which  separates  one  thing  from  another 
clearly, although this point is determined by social conventions. This 
marking point indicates the minimum requirement(s) for survival of a 
constitutive value of an agent. It tells which should not be traded away 
if one does not want to risk loss of a desired value. This is why Raz 
thought that in most cases, where there is incommensurability, there is 
ultimate truth and there is nothing further behind it, nor is it a sign of 
an imperfection.
18 
Crossing this marking point only means betrayal of the constitutive 
value  by  means  of  which  the  nature  of  an  agent  is  so  thoroughly 
changed and affected that the agent has to redefine itself. For instance, 
a scientist cannot, if he holds the principle that a scientist must study 
and  reveal  nothing  but  truth,  lie  to  the  public  about  the  negative 
ecological and environmental influences of constructing a reservoir. 
Even under high political pressure, he has to stick to this principle. 
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Otherwise, he is doing something betraying himself and his profession 
as a scientist.
19 Thus to prevent this from happening, an agent must act 
in  a  way  keeping  all  things  above  that  critical  point.  In  practical 
reasoning, there is the duty to make the right move that will keep all 
constitutive values in play. The incommensurability reveals that the 
hard or all-or-nothing feature of a principle in both morality and law 
resides in the fact that such a principle serves to guard certain bottom 
line.
20 The incommensurability and a solid bottom line to be secured 
explain the hard side of a principle.  
In this regard, Ayn Rand’s example is a good illustration that there 
is no compromise between a property owner and a burglar. Offering 
the burglar a single teaspoon of one’s silverware is actually  a total 
surrender, but not a compromise of reorganisation of his rights to his 
property.  She  contended  that  once  the  principle  of  unilateral 
concession is accepted as the basis of a relationship by both parties, it 
is only a matter of time before the burglar gets all the rest. This is why 
she concluded that there “can be no compromise on basic principles or 
on fundamental issues.” To her, compromises can only be struck when 
there  is  a  legitimate  concession  or  a  trade  on  a  mutually  accepted 
principle.
21 
But the demanded critical point has to be specific and precise in 
order to construct a departing point, a symbolic point. It has to be 
represented by certain concrete facts or issues as demonstrated in the 
above two cases, like the exchange of a lover’s company for money, 
where one assumes that love is a fundamental, incommensurable to 
one’s  life.    This  is  not  a  role  that  could  be  fulfilled  by  abstract 
                                                 
19 David Bodanis, winner of the Aventis Prize, provided some real examples to show 
that  sometimes  scientists  even  sacrifice  life  to  protect  their  principles  against 
political pressure. One of them is David Kelly, a British scientist who committed 
suicide  after  the  UK  government  criticized  his  research  of  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  in  Iraq.  Bodanis,  David,  "Scientists  Have  no  Chance  against  Spin 
Doctors," Financial Times (Europe), 24/5/2006. 
20 Readers can link this with the difference between policies and principles I have 
discussed in Section 3.4. 
21 Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden, The Virtue of Selfishness: a new concept of 
egoism, 36th pr., New York [etc.]: Penguin books, 1961, p. 68-9. 9 
 
 
 
principles themselves, but it has to be carried out by more concrete 
rules functioning as instantiations of principles. Here we can tell the 
difference between the principle that one must cherish human life, and 
the rule that one shall not kill.
22 In this sense, the rule resembles or 
seems  like  a  principle  due  to  its  rigidity  and  strictness  that  derives 
force from the fundamentality of the principle to an agent. This is the 
reason why we may mistake this kind of rules for principles.
23   
ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS AND INTEGRITY  
Though the counter-example that one can leave his spouse to earn a 
living cannot rebut the incommensurability of values, instead it points 
out the flexibility of principles: Once above a compulsory bottom line, 
there is certainly some room for deliberation. One can strike a balance 
between his lover’s companionship and the need for income on the 
condition that he is sure of not trespassing the marking point indicated 
in the symbolic action.  
The  softness  and  flexibility  indicated  by  this  example  can  be 
observed in other constitutive principles as well, and can be captured 
by the concept of balancing. As to this concept of balancing, I adopt 
Aleinikoff’s  broader  view.  He  regarded  balancing  as  a  substantive 
approach  in  which  underlying  interests,  values  and  principles  are 
identified, evaluated and compared.  In such a process, either one’s 
interest  outweighs  another,  or  by  a  ‘proper’ balance,  each  value  or 
interest survives and is given its due 
                                                 
22 One may argue that one can be allowed to kill in time of war and in case of mercy 
killing concerning euthanasia. But I will argue that such cases are just exceptions of 
the rule.  
23 This kind of rules, as direct instantiations of principles, forms the first type of rules 
which I will call PR rules. Their function is to secure the bottom lines of principles 
and from the standards they set we can judge what is in accordance with and against 
principles directly. The other type, by contrast, is PO rules of policy nature that are 
made  to  optimize  relative  principles  by  means  of  a  balancing  and  compromise 
process. The two types of rules indicate accordingly two categories of rule-principle 
relationships. This will be fully discussed in Chapter 7.  10 
 
 
 
The maintenance of a couple’s life depends on certain income and 
thus  one  ‘must  exchange’  one’s  lover  for  a  certain  income.
24  This 
reminds us of the fact that to an agent there are multiple values to be 
pursued, which are equally important and have to be balanced with 
each  other.  The  incommensurability  of  values  does  not  necessarily 
mean that they cannot be balanced and compromised with other values 
on the condition that certain bottom lines are to be secured. Balancing 
is a necessity to pursue principles that are ideal goals and values,
25 
whose significant role can be demonstrated clearly in pursuit of human 
ideals. But in order to make the further discussion possible, first I have 
to comment on the relation between principles, values and ideals.  
The concept of ideal is largely based on the concept of value. An 
ideal is a value that is future-oriented and cannot be grasped by any 
present formulation.
26 As Rescher put it, “Ideals envision a condition 
of affairs in which some sort of value is realized in limitless and thus 
‘unrealistic’  degree,”  and  “there  are  bound  to be  as many  different 
kinds of ideals as there are kinds of values.”
27 In this sense, it is safe to 
say that ideals represent the optimal or the aspirational perspective of 
values.  
But there is a problem with the relation between principles and 
ideals. As Van der Burg argued, scholars usually do not distinguish the 
two. For instance, he noticed that Dworkin shifted from principles to 
ideals and thus blurred the two in Law’s Empire. Alexander Peczenik 
argued that “Each principle expresses an idea, in other words a value, 
for  instance  it  stipulates  that  equality,  freedom,  and  dignity  are 
                                                 
24 Although it might be silly to under stand that love implies constant company, but it 
is no way to deny that close company is what most lovers want.  
25  The  idea  to  regard  principles  as  ideal,  aspirational  and  insatiable  has  been 
mentioned in section 3.3, 3.4, and 4.3, and will be developed in this section.  
26 Wibren van der Burg and Sanne Taekema, The Importance of Ideals: debating 
their relevance in law, morality, and politics, Bruxelles [etc.]: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 
2004, p. 25.   
27 N. Rescher, Ethical Idealism: an inquiry into the nature and function of ideals, 
Berkeley, Calif. [etc.]: University of California Press, 1987, p. 115, p. 116. The main 
line of my following argument draws on Rescher’s discussion of the limitations of 
ideals, mainly Chapter 5.  11 
 
 
 
valuable.”
28 To avoid this problem, Van der Burg suggested that we 
should regard vague and ambiguous values like autonomy as ideals, 
while “reserve the category of principles for more specific and less 
ambiguous standards. In his view, such an example is a principle like 
“A doctor is only allowed to administer medical treatment if she has 
the free and informed consent of the patient.”
 29  
At this point, I will not engage myself in a theoretical discussion 
about whether principles are really different from ideals and in which 
way. The point here is that principles, as representing values, have an 
optimizing, aspirational, or insatiable nature contributing to the above 
confusion, although the two are different things.
30 It has been regarded 
by Edwige Burg as “ideal ought statements.”
31 This explains why in 
Law’s Empire Dworkin could make a shift unconsciously by regarding 
principles as law’s promise to people.
 32  
If my view that principles are relatively fundamental goals to an 
agent is adopted, even if they are indeed vague and unspecified, we 
can understand them as ideal goals that run through an agent’s whole 
life,  whose  meanings  are  to  be  explored  gradually  in  its  future 
development. It is on the ground of the aspirational and optimizing 
nature  that  the  following  argument  illustrating  the  importance  of 
balancing  to  ideals  can  help  us  understand  why  balancing  is  a 
necessity in pursuing principles. 
According to Rescher, we could attribute this necessity to the co-
existence of different ideals of an agent and the limitations set by their 
                                                 
28 Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason, Dordrecht [etc.]: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1989, p. 75.  
29 Van der Burg, Wibren, "The Importance of Ideals," the Journal of Value Inquriy, 
Vol.  31,  1997,  p.  26.  Also:  Wibren  van  der  Burg  and  Sanne  Taekema,  The 
Importance of Ideals: debating their relevance in law, morality, and politics , p. 17. 
30 Section 3.6 has distinguished principles from ends, goals and values by means of 
their normative nature.  
31  Edwige  Burg,  The  Model  of  Principles:  the  quest  for  rationality  in  the 
implementation of conflicting principles, pp. 98-101.  
32  Our  ideals,  as Kronman  argued,  are  aspirational  goals  that  define  the  kind  of 
people we would like to be. Anthony T. Kronman, "Alexander Bickel' s Philosophy 
of Prudence," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 94, 1984, p. 1577. 12 
 
 
 
interaction with each other in pursuit of these ideals.
33  This is because 
ideals do not exist in a vacuum and do not operate in isolation. Healthy 
development of the agent only lies in the integrity of all ideals and 
depends on balanced pursuit.  
“Here, as elsewhere, health is a question of harmony and 
balance—of giving the diverse elements of a rational economy 
of  values  a  chance  to  flourish  in  their  proper  place….  The 
cultivation of ideals is profitable only within the setting of a 
concern  for  the  overall  ‘economy’  of  the  system  of  values 
whose interaction imposes mutual constrains. And the health of 
such an economy is destroyed when one element is aggrandized 
by expanding its scope at the cost of the very life of others.”
34 
In reality, the examples that over—and thus likely unbalanced—
commitment to an ideal at the costs of others are by no means rare. He 
took  the  overemphasis  of  public  order  by  Robespierre  in  French 
Revolution for example and argued that such commitment simply went 
too far to secure other equally important ideals. Balancing thus could 
keep  every  principle  in  play  and  provides  flexibility  without 
sacrificing  legitimacy.
35  Ideals  that  do  not  accept  compromise  will 
never be fully realized in the long run, because the overemphasis that 
neglects the practical possibility, will only lead to the collapse of the 
whole agent.  
“Compromise occurs in the cultivation of an ideal when one 
tempers or limits its further pursuit because its interaction with 
other  values  requires  some mutual  accommodation—to press 
further  with  the  supposedly  ‘compromised’  ideal  in  the 
prevailing circumstances would frustrate our other equally valid 
objectives.”
36 
                                                 
33 N. Rescher, Ethical Idealism: an inquiry into the nature and function of ideals, pp. 
123-9, particularly ‘Pathology’. Since Rescher said that ideals are geared to values 
and people can have inappropriate values as ideals, it would be appropriate to quote 
his argument here. 
34 N. Rescher, Ethical Idealism: an inquiry into the nature and function of ideals, p. 
125. 
35 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, "Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing," p. 961. 
36 
 N. Rescher, Ethical Idealism: an inquiry into the nature and function of ideals, p. 13 
 
 
 
Rescher also reminds us to distinguish compromise from betrayal 
of ideals. Betrayal is the situation that one does not go as far as one 
ought, as distracted by such unworthy things as greed, convenience 
and conformity, etc. Compromise means that one does not go further 
than one ought, in order not to sacrifice other equally important ideals. 
In my view, not willing to compromise is also another kind of betrayal, 
because it damages the desired ideal by destroying the whole project in 
the  long  run.  He  reminded  us  that  to  realize  ideals  one  has  to  be 
realistic by paying attention to the limits of the possible in a complex 
and imperfect world, and one has to content oneself with sub-ideal 
achievements attainable in practice.
 37 
In this respect, with Rescher’s idea in view I want to introduce a 
new  concept,  factual  possibility,  which  is  important  for  my  future 
discussion  of  balancing  in  law.  It  represents  the  conditions  and 
limitations that all constitutive principles or ideals (values) of the same 
agent mutually set to each other. It indicates that in a particular case, 
the optimal realization of a principle has its practical limit when taking 
other relative values or principles into consideration. It represents the 
highest level to optimize a principle practically. This concept will be 
further illustrated by my next chapter. 
In summary, Rescher demonstrates successfully that balancing is a 
necessity in pursuit of principles, because all ideals are integral, co-
existing but not separated in an agent. The consequence of balancing is 
either that a principle will not to be applied in the present case, or that 
it will be compromised and realized partially. Thus the woman who 
does  not  tell  her  father  about  his  illness,  the  example  given  in  the 
beginning of this chapter, does not act against a principle of being 
honest. And a lover who temporarily leaves his spouse to earn some 
money can compromise love with financial need. Both results display 
the soft side of principles in our life. 
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37 N. Rescher, Ethical Idealism: an inquiry into the nature and function of ideals, p. 
125. Here Rescher indeed indicates that compromise only can happen between ideals 
or  values that  belong  to the  same  agent. In other  words,  compromise is  internal 
instead of external.  14 
 
 
 
But I shall point out that while Rescher only paid attention to the 
competitive side of ideals, he neglected the fact that the improvement 
of conflicting values indeed can benefit each other mutually in the long 
run. For instance, in the political domain, he thought that public order 
and  individual  freedom  are  controversial.  But  we  all  know  that  it 
depends on what kind of social order one has in mind. To a totalitarian 
state, suppression of its subjects’ right to free speech in order to secure 
public order only amounts to more disorder in future. Conversely, it is 
no doubt that in a democracy where citizens are endowed with right to 
free  speech,  public  order  can  be  more  improved  than  impeded 
consequently in the long run.
38  
The interplay and interaction between different principles within an 
agent contribute to its integrity. From this perspective, principles of an 
agent  are  interdependent.  We  should  understand  that  mostly  the 
optimization of a principle depends on to what extent other principles 
of the same agent are realized due to the mutual limitations they put on 
each other.  
A REASSESSMENT OF THE TWO FEATURES  
The above two sections intend to explain the two opposing features of 
principle.  Incommensurability  explains  that  certain  bottom  lines 
required by principles must not be crossed, which figures in the hard 
character of principle. With such bottom lines secured, the soft side 
refers to the necessity of balancing for the healthy development of an 
instituion. The aspirational nature of principle requires that all should 
be balanced with each other in order to be optimized when taken as a 
whole.  Thus the two features are not contrary to each other actually.   
                                                 
38  “It  is  perfectly  conceivable  that  the  public  interest—even  in  ‘security’  or  in 
national  ‘self-preservation’—might  be  better  served  by  maintaining  freedom  of 
speech than by the policies and programs to which the first amendment is asked to 
yield. It may be that in the long run, freedom of speech is safer than repression.” L. 
Frantz, "The First Amendment in the Balance," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 71, No. 8, 
1961, p. 1439.   15 
 
 
 
Enrico Pattaro raised an alternative view to understand principles’ 
role in legal reasoning, and he also observed two similar sides.
39 The 
first  is  a  deliberative  side  that  principles  are  not  conclusive  but 
indicative  and  contextual.  Their  meanings  shall  be  gradually 
developed, defined and redefined in a progressive process. They play a 
role  of  restriction  on  arbitrariness  and  discretion  by  means  of  an 
indicative criterion. Contrary to this, the second is a deductive side as 
premises in legal reasoning. In this sense they should be regarded as 
fixed  and  self-evident,  because  only  then  inference  can  be  a 
mechanical intellectual operation. From this perspective, principles are 
hard and inflexible like rules with a merely “all or nothing” character. 
As Pattaro indicated, according to whether we look at principle from a 
deductive or from a progressive point of view, we will have different 
views.
40  
In short, how we perceive them depends on how they are deployed 
in  an  agent,  which  will  further  our  comprehension.  The  hard 
characteristic, as a premise in practical reasoning, indicates the mature 
side of principles that have been well developed. They constitute the 
maturity  parts  of  an  agent  that  construct  its  identity,  and  provide 
stability and consistency. In this sense, the development of principles, 
as ideals, is not casual and random, but follows a pattern or a path that 
is rather predictable by the past. To secure the principle, by securing a 
marking point and a bottom line, is to maintain an agent’s identity. The 
future of an institution can, to a large extent, be defined by the pre-
established principles.  
In contrast, the soft side indicates the potential of development of 
an  agent  that  is  undetermined  and  under  constant  construction  in 
forthcoming new circumstances, in which an agent’s past, present and 
future conjoin. In such a development it requires consistently that each 
                                                 
39  Enrico  Pattaro,  "Models  of  Reasoning,  Types  of  Principles  and  Reasoning. 
Historical Comments and Theoritical Outlines," Ratio juris, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1988, pp. 
119-21. 
40  Enrico  Pattaro,  "Models  of  Reasoning,  Types  of  Principles  and  Reasoning. 
Historical Comments and Theoritical Outlines," p. 119. Normally the deductive role 
of principles is assumed to provide more legitimation, but lack flexibility.  16 
 
 
 
principle  should  be  optimized  and  balanced,  which  allows  new 
developments of the conflicting principles and thus the agent itself at 
stake.  We  should  understand  the  requirement  of  consistency  of 
principle in the way that it flows from the demand of optimization. 
And  an  agent’s  development  is  a  synonym  of  the  optimal 
development,  or  the  balanced  development  of  its  constitutive 
principles.  
We therefore have to be aware that the bottom line, or the marking 
point of a principle embedded in certain symbolic actions, will not be 
fixed permanently. As the optimal or aspirational nature of a principle 
requires, it will be gradually lifted in progressive development. This 
can  be  observed  well  in  the  development  of  human  rights  in  past 
decades  in  that  the  standards  of  human  rights  have  been  extended 
largely to social, culture and economic rights, rather than limited to 
political and civil ones. We also observe that such bottom lines have 
been gradually raised in the development of people’s welfare rights in 
western states.  
 